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How do changes  in the level of government purchases  a.fect the macroeconomy? This paper
looks at the eflects  of tempora,ry government purchases  in the context ofa simple dynamic general
equilibrium  model.  The  model is parameterised in  a pa.rsimonious  manner  and perturbed  by
a spending shock thai  captures the temporaxy component of government spending in the  US
during World  War II.  There is a remarkable correspondence  between the movements in output,
consumption and efrort predicted by the model and those observed in reality.1.  futroduction
The  manner in  which the spending decieions  of governments aflect the  level of economic
activity  is one of the  central issues of macroeconomics.  The  way iu which  economists think
about  this  issue has evolved over time  as our  understanding  of  the  aggregate economy ha,s
growu.  The neoclassical  synthesis that  grew out of the Keynesian revolution asuibed  a key role
to  government purchases in stabilizing  output  fluctuations.  This  role rested on, among other
things,  the existence of a multiplier  for government spending, so that  relatively  small changes
in spending could ofrset relatiyely  large fluctuations  iu output.  Ilowever, events of ihe  1970's
called into  question ma.ny of the  cetrtral tenets of the  neoclassical  synthesis and spurred the
development of alternative, equilibrium  models of the macroeconomy that  were based explicitly
on the optimizing  behaviour of households and firms.  Mosi  of these models had their  origin
in  the neoclassical growth  model developed by  Solow(1956), augmented to  include long-lived
households  that make optimal decisions  about consumption, work efiort and saving over time.  In
an intertemporal  framework, the distinction  between cha.nges  in government purchases  that  are
temporary  and those tha,t are permanent, as well as that  between changes  that  a,re  anticipated
versus una.nticipated, becomes important.  Barro's(1981) pioneering anlaysis of  the efiects of
government purchases  on output  claimed that there was no multiplier  eflect, and that temporary
changes  had larger output  effects than  permarent  cha,nges.  However Aiyagari,  Christiano  and
Eichenbaum(l989)  have recently shown that  this  is not,  in  fact,  the case in  a fully  specified
dynamic general equilibrium  model. They show that  the output  efects of a permanent increase
in government purchases  a.re  always greater than those of a temporary  increase, and that  there
can be an analog to the Keynesian multiplier  in a neoclassical  model.
The  purpose of this  paper  is to  evaluate the empiricai  plausibility  of  the  predictions  of
the neoclassical model concerning changes  in government purchases. The strategy  adopted is
to  parameterise a relatively  simple version of the model -  the specification most often used
to illustra.te its  basic properties -  and then compare the movernents in output,  consumption,
effort etc. predicted by the rnodel in response to a shock to government purchases  with  actual
experience. The methodology is simliar to that  commonly used to evaluate the empirical content
of real business  cycle models, with  the exception that  I compare paths of rariables raiher  than
second moments generated by  the model and the  data.  I  focus on the  effects of temporary
changes in  the  level of  government purchases, and in  particular,  one well  defined episode of
such temporary  variation,  namely World  War IL  The huge increases  in government purchases
that  occurred  over the  course of this  conflict,  followed  by equally  large declines at, its  end,
are the natural  empirical  counterparts of temporary  deviations of government purchases fromtheir  stea.dy state level in  the  artificial  economy of the  model.  Furthermore,  the  size of the
stimulus  that  came from  the government during  ihe war years was large enough that  we can
reasonably abstract  from  other factors  that  usually  contribute  to  fluctuations  in  the  level of
economic activity.
The practice of looking at episodes  of.extreme lariation  in economic.  aggregates  as natural
experiments that  enable us to discriminate between compeiing economic theories has its origin
in the work by Friedman(I95l)  and Cagan(1956)  on the Quantity Theory.  Thus Friedman writes
"The  widespread tendency in empirical studies of economic behaviour to  discard war
years as "abnorrnal",  while  doubtless often justified,  is, on  the whole,  unfortunate-
The  major  defect of the  data on which  economists must  rely  -  data  generated by
experience rather than deliberately contrived experiment -  is ihe small range of vari-
ation  they  encompass.  Experience in  general proceeds smoothly  a,nd continuously.
In  consequence,  it  is difficult  to disentangle systematic eflects from  random variation
since both  are of much the same order of magnitude.  From this  point  of view, data
for wartime  periods a.re  peculiarly  valuable. At  such times, violent changes  in major
economic magnitudes occul  orrer relatively  brief periods, thereby providing  precisely
the kind  of evidence that  we would like [io] get by  "critical"  experiments if we could
conduct them.  Of course, the source of the  changes  means that  the effects in which
we are interested are necessarily  intertwined  with  others that  we would eliminate from
a contrived experiment.  But  this difficuliy  applies io  all our data, not  to  data from
wartime periods  alone." Friedman(1951),  p.612.
The empirical studies ofthe  effects  of government purchases  on the level of economic activity
and interest rates by Barro(1981,1987) and Ahmed(1986) have a.lso  relied heavily on wartime
episodes  of high military  spending to obtain  quantitatively  significart  temporary  movements in
government purchases.
2.  The  One  Sector  Neoclassical  Growth  Model
Consider an economy populated by a large number of identical households. The preferences
of each household are defined over consumption and lei6ure, both  of which  are assumed to  be
normal goods- Households are inffnitely  lived and have perfect foresight concerning the future.
Each household has access  to a priyate production technologr which transforms capital and effort
into output.  Current  period output  may be consumed, stored a.s  capital for future  production
or appropriated by the government. There is no rationale for the existence of a government in
this economy: I simply  posit its existence and aasume  that  it  absorbs some amount of outpuieach periodr financing its purchases  by lump sum taxation.  Government purchases  of output  do
not substitute  for private consumption; nor do they enhance the productivity  of private factors
of production  1.  Growth  occurs due to labor  augmenting technica.l cha.nge  which  proceeds at
some exogenously given deterministic  rate.
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All variables a,re  in per capita terms and have the obvious interpretations.  The objective function
is time separable, wiih  the point-in-time  uiiliiy  function  assumed to  be continuous and twice
differentiable in  C and .L. The production  function  is aseumed  to  exhibit  constant returns  to
scale in  capital  and effective labor.  The  gro6s rate of labor  augrnenting technical  change is
denoted by {,,  with  f,  =  Xr+t/Xr2.  Technical change must be expressable  in labor augmenting
form to be consistent with the existence  ofa steady state. This problem differs from the standard
optimal growth problem because  of the inclusion of the term Gr in the resource  constraint.  This
can be interpreted as a shock to technolog5r  that leaves  marginal products uncharged: I interpret
it  as the amount resources  appropriated by the governmeni each period3.  The absence  of this
term from  the utility  and production  functions reflects the parasitic role of government in this
model--
r  Ifdesired,  governrnent  purchases  could be posited to enter ihe utility  function in a separable
manner, thereby giving some rationale for their existence, without  aliering  any of what follows.
'  Recent research has cast doubt on the abiliiy  of the neoclassical  growth  model to explain
va,riations in growth  rates across  countries ard  over time -  see,  for example, Lucas(1988) and
King and Rebelo(1989). Deterministic technical change  is included in this model as the simplest
way to  account for the observed nonstationarity  of macroeconomic time series. Repeating the
analysis in this paper using an alternative model of the determinants of economic growth  would
provide valuable insights into the relationship between transitory  shocks and long run growth.
3 The equivalence between technologSr  shocks  and various fiscal policies was ffrst explored by
Abel and Blanchard(1983).
a See  Barro(1987) for a discussion  of how this mieht  matter.To anall'se  this problem  the standa.rd  procedure  is  to transform  it into a stationary  economy.
This is accomplished  by dividing the model  variables  by the nonstationary  growth variable  X.
Define  4 = q/Xt,  kt = Kt/Xt, 9t = GtlXt, vt =Y/Xt,  and  deffne  the Lagra"ngean
f, = DB-t  U  (q,  I - Xr)  + t^,[r'(r,,  ff,)  + (r - 6)fu  - c,  - t,k+r -  stf, (5)
where A1 denotes the multiplier  associated  with the period i constraint.  The first order necessary
conditions characterising the solution of this problem are
D1U(c1,1-  1Vr)  = lr
D2U  (q,l -  Nt)  = ^tD2F(h,  Nt)
d-i,+r[(l - 6)  + D1-F(t'+1,  I{r+r)]  = €,)'
F(tl,Xr)  + (1- 6)ir  = ct!4*kt+tlst
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Di  denotes difierentiation  with  respect to  the  i'th  argument,  4  =  f*/(F.)r,  and B.  is the
efrective rate of time preferences.
The sarne  set of equations characterize the equilibrium  of a decentralized competitive econ-
omy with a large number ofhouseholds and firms. Households  choose  time paths for consumption
aud leisure to maximise a function identica.l  to (1) subject to a constraint that consumption and
saving each period ca.nnot,  exceed income from supplying labor  to  a competitive  labor market
plus interest  income, all net of lump  sum taxes.  Firms  choose time paths for investment and
employment to maxirnise the preeent value of profits, with  capitat accumulation being financed
by issuing bonds to the household sector.
Eliminating  11 from equations (6) and (?) we gei
"##B=q=  DzF(kt,Nr)
where  ra1  is the real  wage.  The equality  ofthe marginal  rate  ofsubstitution between  consumption
and leisure  wiih the marginal  productivity of labor descibes  the equilibrium  of a competitive
labor market.
5 See  King, Plosser  and fubelo(1988).Now consider equations (6) and (8).  Noie that  A1 can be interpreted  as a present value
price, so we ca"n  define an interest rate by (1*  11)  = {,/4f  14a1. The equilibrium  of a competitive
loan ma.rket with  firms a.nd  households as the sole participants  is given by
ffi:lfiA=  t  { ,"1  =  (l  - 6)  +  DIF(}'+',nrr+r)'
Equation  (9), the resource constraint, has the interpretation  of a goods market clearing condi-
tton"  -
The steady state of the economy is the solution to the nonlinea,r  system
D1U(c,r-N)=)'
D2U(c,l  -  ltt) = .f  Drf(4,  l/)
B"[(l-6)  +Dlr(e,N)={,





where the absence  of time subscripts is used to denote steady state values of the variables. The
specifications of the utility  and production  functions guala.ntee  that  the steady state exists and
is unique.
3.  The  Efrect  of  Governrnent  Purchases
How does an increase in government purchases aflect the equilibrium  of this economy? A
permanent increase  in government purchases,  financed by an increase  in lump sum ta-res,  lowers
household wealth.  Since consumption a.nd  leisure are both normal goods, consumption falls and
effort rises. The increase  in the supply of efort  raises  the marginal productiviiy  of capital, and
thereby increases the size of ihe optimal  steady state capital stock.  During  the transition  to
ihe higher capital stock the interest rate is above its long level. Consumption  iniiially  falls by
more than the increase in government purchases,  but grows over time and eventually settles at
a level below its iniiial  level.  In  the new steady state equilibrium  invectment is higher,  as is
output.  In  the absence  of distortionary  taxation,  an increase in the share of output  absorbed
by the government is fully  reflected in a decline in the share going to private consumption.  The
level of private consumption, however, may fall by more or less  than the increase in the level of
government purchases.
o A more extensive discussion  of the equivalence  between the centrally planned and compet-
itive economies is contained in Abel and Blanchard(1983).A  temporary  increase in government purchases, on the other  ha,nd, will  have a relatively
small efect  on household wealth.  The  inuease  in the  dema.nd  for  goods by  the government
mea,ns  that  output  is relatively  more acarce in  the present tha.n in  the future.  This  bids up
the real intereet rate and induces houeeholds  to consume less and work more for the duration
of  the  period  of temporarily  high government purchases.  Part  of  the  increased demand  by
the government is met by reduced private  investmeut, with  the result that  after  ihe period of
temporarily  high  government purchaees  the capital  stock is below its  optimal  long run  level.
This  leads to  a period of high growth  for the economy as the capital stock is rebuilt.  When
episodes  of temporalily  high purchases  are anticipated, iheir impact effects  on consumption and
effort will be smaller. Anticipating  higher taxes at some point in the future  households  inuease
their saving so as  to smooth the effects  ofthe  higher taxes. This translates into increased  capital
accumulation  at the aggregate level.  The  arnount of omoothiug that  is done in response to  a
shock of a given size is determined by two key parametersi  these are the  (efrective) discount
rate, B*, and the rate of depreciation of capital, 6. Low values for B.  (given the intertemporal
elasticity  of substitution  and the exogenous  rate of technical change) correspond to high pure
rates of time preference,  which reduce the amount of smooihing that is carried out in response  to
an anticipated shock. Similarly, high rates of capital depreciation make it more difficult or costly
to  accumulate capital in advance of periods of high levels of government spending, which  also
acts to reduce the amount of smoothing.  These lower levels of smoothing manifest themselves
in greater impact  effects on consumption and efort  of the higher government purchases when
they occur, and sma.ller  responses  before and after the shock period.
Another  important  feature of this  model is that  it  is a one good model.  The amount  of
resources  available this period that can be consumed,  invesied or appropriated by the government
consists of output  produced with  capital and labor this period plus the undepreciated portion
of the capital stock. This is important  in understanding the response  of the capital etock in this
model to an anticipated increase  in government spending. Capital is accumulated in anticipation
of a shock to allow higher levels  of production when the government is demanding a lot of output
by combining  it  with  extra labor input  at such times.  But  part  of the higher demand by ihe
government is mei by running  down the capital stock to such a.n  extent that  it  falls below its
steady state level afier  the period of higher government purchases. This  is optimal  given the
wishes of agents to Bmooth consumption and leisure over time.
The objective of this paper is to use  thie model to evaluate the effects  ofgovernment induced
shocks on the economy. To do so, I  need to  specify the parameterc of tastes and technology,
other characteristics of the steady state and the naiure and duration  of the shocks. It  is to thisthat  I now turn.
4.  Calibration
To examine ihe dynamics of this model I need to assign  values  to the following parametersT:
8,N,o.",o4,ap,o11,0n,6,a61i.,Q  and dr.  The ra.nge  of poosible  values  that we can assign  to
these parameters is limiied  by the requirement that the utility  a.nd  production  functions satisfy
stardard  neoclassical "nicenees" restrictions.  Our  choice is further  circumscribed by focusing
only on values that  in some  sense  might be considered  representative ofthe  U.S. economy during
World  War II.
I begin with  the parameters of household's preferences. Choosing a value of B =  0.9615 is
consistent with  the ea.rlier  work ofKydland  and Prescott(1982) and I{ansen(1985). It is difficuli
to obtain empirical estimates for the various substitution  elasticities of the utility  function,  a"",
o.1, ap  and o11. I  opted for  the logarithmic  specification of utility,  setting  o""  =  on  =  -!,
and o"1 =  ar"  =  0.  This  is a reasonably "neutral"  benchmark specification, and is used for
initial  investigation  of the  response of the  model to  government purchase shockss.  I  set the
proportion  of time devoted to market activities in the steady state, -l/, equat to 0.333. This is
consistent with  the finding  that  households a.llocate  about one-third  of their  available time to
ma.rket activities.  Alternatively,  if  we assume  that  an individual  can work  at most 16 hours a
day, 7 days a week, we come up with  an estimate of 112 hours as the weekly endowment of time.
From  the Handbook  of Labor  Statistics we can obtain  time  series on Average Weekly Hours
of Work in Manufacturings.  Normalizing  these figures by the endowment of 112 and averaging
over the period  1931-1940,  we obtain a figure of 0.337, which is suspiciously clooe  to one-ihird-
I picked a value for €" =  1.018  based on extracting a common determinjstic trend from per
capiia  GNP, Persona,l  Consumption  Expenditures,  Gross Private  Investment and Goyernment
Purchases  of Goods and Services  over the period 1889-1986.  Data for the years prior to  1929  are
taken from  Kendrick,  Productivity  l\ends  in  the Ilnited  Sta;es10. The choice of deterministic
detrending is motirated  by two considerations. Firsily  ii  is ihe logical empirical counterpart  of
the deterministic technological change  that induces  nonsiationarity  in the rnodel. Secondly there
'  For definitions of the various parameters see  the appendix.
E This  is the speciffcation used by  Long  a"nd Plosser(1983) in  their  seminal study  of  real
business  cycles.
9 Manufacturing  was chosen  solely on grounds ofdata  availability.  Figures for average  weekly
hours in the total  private sector are not available before 1947.
ro  The reeults do not  change if we use the alternative estimates of GNP  developed by Balke
and Gordon(1989) and Romer(1989). If we use only the official NIPA  data for ihe period 1929-
1982 we obtain  an estimate oI 2.472% for the average annual rate of growth  of the per capita
aggregates.is the evidence from  the time series  properties of ihe key national  accounts aggregates. Tables
1.A and 1.B present the sample autocorrelation functions for GNP  and its key components up
to five lags in both levels and first difierences. The evidence in these tables suggests  that  these
series  are nonstationary.  To get some  idea whether the nonstationarity  could be accounted  for by
stochastic or deterministic  trends, I carried out the standard Dickey-Fuller tests for unit  roots.
The  results of these tests are reported in Table 2.  The  hypothesis of a unit  root  (stochastic
trend)  is rejected at the 57o  level for a.ll series  except consumptionlr.  In light  of this, it  seems
reasonable to proceed with  the deterministic  detrending.  The unit  of time  is tal<en  to be one
year, so combined with  the assumed value of p  this implies a steady state annua.l  real rate of
interest of 5.9%. This is similar to the figure used by King,  Plosser and Rebelo(1988).
01y  is set equal to  0.667, which is an estimate of the share of national  income accruing to
labor  averaged over 1931-40. This  is close io  the type  of numbers that  have been found  by
authors looking  at the share of labor  over longer time  periods.  The elasticiiy  of substitution
between capital and labor, oK,y, was set equal to one, and the depreciation rate, 6, equal to 0.1.
Fina.lly we come to specifying the characteristics of the government. The objective of this
paper is to examine how well a simple neoclassical  model can capture the movements in macroe-
conomic variables that  were brought about by ihe large changes  in government purchases  during
WWII.  The principal  requirement of the analysis is data for {f}  that  measure the deviation  of
government purchases  in the U.S. from their steady state level (somehow  defined) during the war
years 1942-1945. If we look at the behaviour of time series  on government purchases, and ihe
conponents  thereof, in the US over the course of the twentieth  century, it  is clear that  almost
all of the temporary variation is due to expansions  and contractions of federal defense  purchases
associated with  wars. This  fact was exploited by Barro(1981) to simplify  the decomposition of
government purchases  into  transitory  and permanent components. The permanent component
of the ratio  of federal defense  purchases  to  GNP, 9,,  was calculated using a standard present
value definition  a.nd  a forecasting equation driven by a casualty rate variable and a measure of
government capital.  An estimaie off  is then given by (S- -  S-)/@-  +So ), where g-  is the ratio
of federa.l  defense  purchases  to GNP, and gr the ratio offederal  non-defense  purchases  and state
rr  This contradicts the findings of Nelson and Plosser(1982) who claim to ffnd a unit  root in
real per capita GNP. The  diference may be due to my use of a longer sample period.  Nelson
and Plosser use estimates of GNP  by the Commerce Department  that  go back to  1909. I  use
the estimates of GNP  in  Kendrick(1961)  which  go back to  1889 and which  Romer(1988) has
argued are superior to ihe Commerce series. The standard Dickey-Fuller test on Romer's GNP
series also fails to find evidence of a unit  root.  Given the low statistical power of existing tests
for unit  roots and the conflicting  nature  of the evidence to  date, use of a deterministic  trend
has the advantage of simpliciiy  and being well understood as regards potential  misspecification
Dlas.and local purchases  to GNP. This series  can be calculated from  Table 2 of Barro(1981), and is
plotted  in Figure  1. The transitory  component of government purchases  is positive during the
three wa.rs  that  occurred during the sample period:  WWII,  Korea and Vietnam.  The increase  in
government purchaees  during WWII  is enormous compared to what took place during the other
wars, thus motivating  my focus on ihis war alone. The estimaied values  ofi  are (I.09,2-14,2.82,
2.58) for 1942-1945. Thus government purchasee  were more than  twice their  steady state level
in  1942, more than  three times in  1943 and almost four times their  steady state level in  1944-
So the shocks to government purchases  associated  with  WWII  were rather large. Note also the
uneven size of the shock in the ditrerent war years -  ihis will  be important  in interpreting  the
analysis that  follows.
The last parameter to be set is 0r, I chose  a value of0.2051, equal to the average  value over
1931-1940  of lu  !  gt  as reported in Table 2 of Barro(1981). This figure seems  rather high, aud
in fact reflects the fact  that  the relative price of government purchases has increased steadily
over the course of the century. An alternative estimate is given by the average  value of the ratio
of nominal  government purchases to  nominal  GNP  over the same period.  This  comes out  as
0.1435.
The  analysis of the model proceeds by feeding in the series on the purchases shocks and
Iooking direcily  at the effects on the va,rious  series. This contrasts with  the more usual practice
in  real business cycle models of examining  the implications  for various moments of particular
shock processes.  Prescoit(1986)  eschews direct  compa.rison  of  the  paths  of  series generated
by  a model  with  those generated by  experience as an  approach to  model evaluation on  the
basis of the sensiiivity  of predictions of paths to  ,,whimsical modelling assumptions,' a.nd  euors
in  the  measurement of the  shocks that  drive the  model that  may  be as la.rge as the  shocks
themselves.  Concern with  measurement error  is warranted  when one is looking  at  a model
driven  by  unobservable technology shocks.  For the  present study  this  is not  a concern as it
seems  unlikely that  the errors in the measurement of government purchases  during WWII  were
as large as the change in government purchases  during  that  period.
5.  A  Baseline  Simulation
I begin by looking at the effects of four successive  periods of temporarily  high government
purchases  occurring at (modet) dates 0 through 3. The higher spending in period 0 can in some
sense  be considered  unanticipated,  but that  in periods 1 to 3 is perfectly foreseen. Thus, we are
looking at an experiment in which households  a,re  surprised by the outbreak of a war, but as  soon
as it  begins they know exactly its magnitude and duration.  This is importa"nt in understanding
10how investment in period 0 responds to the higher level of purchases. If  the shock only  lasted
one period we would expect to see  investment declining,  Instead ii  increa,ses  by some 50% io
help smooth the efects of the shocks in the later periodsrz. Output  and effort increase by 20%
and 30% respectively.  Consumption  declinee by just  over 26% in period  0 and runs at  about
21% below its  long run  level for the duration  of the war.  Output  a.nd  effort  remain relatively
high  during  the first  three periods of the war, declining somewhat in period  3.  Output  fall6
below its steady state level in period 4 due to the decline in the capital stock.  Flom  period 4
on all variables follow the standard path of adjustment associated  with  convergence  to a steady
state from an initia.l capital stock that is below the equilibrium  level. Finally note the behaviour
of real interest rates. Interest rates run at about 2-3 percentage points above their eteady state
level during  the war.  We can estimate ihe multipliers  associated  with  the higher purchases  in
each  period as 0;r(At/0r).  These  turn out to be 0.939,  0.517,  0.311  and 0.144  in periods 0 to
3 respectively.  Clearly  there is no  'rmultiplier"  efrect of government purchases on output  i.e.
output  rises less than  one-for-one with  the  increase in  purchases.  This  is because the  basic
neoclassical  model acts to buffer shocks rather than  to magnify  theml3.  The results of this  of
this simulation  are summarised in column 3 of Table 3 under the heading Model(0).
6.  Comparison  nrith  US  Dxperience  in  WIMII
During  World War II  the United Statec experienced one of the longest periods of sustained
growth in its hietory, exceeded  only by the expansion associated  with  the Vietnam  war and thai
associated wiih  the  Reagan defense  program.  Red  GNP  (in  lg82  dolla.rs) increased by  98%
over 1939-1944,  increasing from $716.6bu to $1380.6  bn. This translates into an annual average
Stowth rate of 14%. Personal Consumption  Expenditures increased by 16% between 1g3g and
1944, going from  $480.5bn to $557.1bn. Purchases  of Durables inoeased from  $Bb.Zbn  in 1989
io  $46.2bn in  1941,  before declining to $26.3bn in 1944 and subsequently recovering to $47.8bn
in 1946, The other components of consumption purchases  (Nondurables and Services)  increased
throughout  the war. Gross Private Investment inffeased from $86bn in lg3g to $138.8bn  in 1g41.
It  then declined dramatically  to $50.4bu in  1943  (bottoming  out in this year), before increasing
$56.4bn  in 1944,  $76.5bn  in 1945  and $178.lbn in 1946. One aspect  of the decline  in private
inveetment that  I  do not  addresg  in thie paper is the fact that  the federal government carried
out a lot of investment in plant and machinery that  was subsequently tra.nsfered to the private
sector at  nominal  prices at  the end of the war.  Gorden(1969) stressed  the importance  of ihis
r2 Note that no matter how far in advance  the shock is anticipated investment always increases
in the first  period of the war because  ol the uneven pattern  of the shocks.
13 See  Barro(1987),  p.320.
11phenomenon in  explaining productivity  developments in the  1g40's. This issue could be dealt
with in the context of the neoclassical  model by having the government purchase la.rge  quantities
of capital goods for a while, followed by a period in which the undepreciated remainder of this
stock is made available for private sector use. Data limitations  preclude the pursuit  of this line
of inquiry  at  the present time.  Government.Purchases of Goocls and services increased from
$144.1bn to  $235.6bn over 1939-41, an inoease  of 68%, before peaking at  $290.8bn in  1944,
a further  increase over the  1941 level of 236%.  Federal Government purchasee increased from
$53.8bn  in 1939  to $153.0bn  in 1941  (184%),  and then to $?22.5bn  h  1944  (tT2% over 1941).
state  and Local Government Purchases  fell from $g0.Bbn  in 1989 to $gz.6bn in 1941 Gg%) and
then io $68.3bn  in 1944  (-12%).
IIow  well do the predictions of the model conform with  the  actual experience of the  US
economy during wwII?  The experiments in the previous section yielded predictions about the
deviations of key aggregates  from  their  steady state levels. The empirical  counterpa.rt to this
can be taken to be the deviations ofobserved series  from their trend levels. The irend levels for
the principal national accounts aggregates,  real GNB  rea.l  personal Consumption Expenditures,
real Gross Private Investment and real Government Purchases  of Goods a.nd  Services,  all in per
capita terms, were calculated by fitting  a common deterministic trend  to them over the period
1E89-1986 In Figure 2I  plot the deviations from trend in percentage  terms for each  series. The
movements in each of the series during wwII  are qualitatively  the same as the predictions of
the modelra. Private consumption expenditures ran at about 10% below trend  during the war,
which is somewhat less  than the predictions from the baseline  model.  Real GNp  was 15% above
trend in 1942, 31% in 1943,  37% in  7944  and 31% in 194b. Gross prirate  investment did decline
rather  dramatically,  by beiween 52(%  and 70Vo: the declines predicted by the model are twice
this in some yea.rs.  Theee figures are under the heading .,Actual,, in Table B-
Matchiug  ihe predictions of the model concerning movements in efiort  to  the data is less
straightforward.  If we look at the behaviour of average  weekly hours ofwork  in manufacturingrb,
we see  that  they were about 45 hours per week in the 1g20's,  fell to about 3g hours per week in
the 1930's,  increased  to around 45 hours at the peak of wwII,  before settling at about 40 hours
per week in the postwar period.  It' is not clear whether the increase  in hours worked during the
war was merely a return  to the pre-Depreesion  norm or whether it  constituted  an increase  over
an already established norm  of a 40 hour week 16. If  *e  take the 40-hour week as the trend
la The deviations  from trend of Government  purchases  a.re  rgg%, l0g|,o,  B42To  md  2gilvc:  in
1942-45.'These  figures  are  slightty  bigger  than the estimates  obtained  from Barro(l9gl).
"  See  lfandbook  of Labor Statistics.
16  Evidence  that this was in fact the case  is the speed  wiih  which the 40 hour week was
12level of hours worked in manufacturing  during WWII,  the percentage deviations in 1942-4b  are
7  .8Vo,  I2.57o,  13.0%  and  8.8%.
The model performs least satisfactorily when it  comes to predicting  movements in interest
rates.  Tempora.rily high levels of government purchases  lead to  increased real interest ra,tes  in
the model, but  it  is dificult  to ffnd  a.ny  evidence of this in  the data.  The  relevant empirical
counterpart  of the interest rate in the model is the ex-ante real rate.  Being unobservable this
is a difficult  variable to measure at  the best of times.  The usual problems associaied with  its
measurement are compounded in this instance by the widespread use of price controls in the us
during WWII  and the pegging of nominal interest rates by the Fed. In Figure 3 I plot a measure
ofthe  ex-poet real rate over 188s1982 relative to its sample mean(l.6z8%)  based  on the rate of
interest on prime commercial paper and the rate of inflation  of the GNp  deflator.  We see  that
it  is negative during the war years. This finding is robust to the use of a.lternative measures  of
the nominal interest rate and inflation  rate.  The substantially  larger negative real rate in  1g4b
is due to the surge in inflation  associated  with  the relaxation of price controls at the end of the
war'  Note also that  Mishkin's(1981) estimates of the ex-ante real rate a.re  negative during this
period.
A  well known feature of the neoclassical  growth  model with  perfect foresight is that  the
impact  effects of a disturbance in any period are intimately  related to the degree  to  which ihe
ehock is anticipatedrT.  By  this I  mean that  tempora,rily high purchases in  period  0 will  have
quantitatively  difrerent effects on output,  consumption, etc.  than  will  an equal sized increase
at  some date in  the future-  The  key is that  shocks at later  dates can be bufiered by  capital
accumulation, whereas the capiial available in period 0 is predetermined.  columns  4-6 of rable
3 show ihe consequences  of moving the start of the war back by one or more periods. whereas
Model(O) is the model output  when the spending shock is unanticipated  i.e.  begins in  period
0, Model(l)  the output  when the shock begins in  period  l,  i.e.  is announced one period  in
advance, etc. As expected, the impact  effects on consumption and effort decline the further  in
advance the war  is anticipated.  The  eflects on output  increase because of the  availability  of
extra  capital  during  the war.  we  also see inceased  disinvestment associated with  the period
of temporarily  high purchases. The effect of the war on interest rates is smaller the furiher  in
adwnce  it  is anticipaied.  Finally, noie that  the paih  of consumption during  the war becomes
a lot smoother (despite the uneven pattern  of shocks) when households are allowed some scope
established after the cessation  of hostilities.  See  ya.rious  issues  ofthe  Survey of Current Eusiness
for 1946. For example in asurvey ofthe  postwa.r  adjustment ofthe  U,S. economy in the February
1946 issue there is repeated reference  to  ,,restoration of the 4Ghour week,'.
rz See  Ilall(19?1),  and Ba"rro  and King(1984).
13for capital accumulation beforehand.
The last column of Table 3, Model(U),  gives the predictions of the model when households
are assumed  to be extremely myopic. The high government spending during period 0 is expected
to last only one period so households  act to bufer  it by disinvesting, not realising that  there will
also be high governqnent  pqrchases  in period 1. Thus they begin period 1 qith  a run down capital
stock and are "surprised" with  another shock to government Bpending. They  disinvest further,
not expecting the war to continue into period 2, and are again surprised when it does. The effect
of this succession  of surprises is to cause  consumption to decline by increasing amounts over the
course  of the war, output  to rise by very little  and efrort to increase  by increasing amounts.  All
of this is attributable  to the ma.nner  in which the capital stock behaves.
Focusing on variations  in  average weekly hours of work  as the empirical  counterpart  of
the efort  variable in the  model may be unnecessa.rily  restrictive.  In  particular  it  ignores the
big changes  in the participation  rate that  occurred during WWII.  Table 4 shows what happens
when the model is simulated using an alternative concept of efort,  In particula.r efort  is now
identified  with  a composite of weekly hours of work a^nd  a measure of the participation  rate.  I
define the pa.rticipation rate as the ratio  of the number of Full Time  Equivalent  Employees in
Private  Industry  a,nd Government and Government Enterprises to  the Toial  Population.  The
average value of this ratio  over 1929-82  is 0.324, so /y' is set equal to  (0.333)(0.324).  A  lower
value of  1{  effectively means a  higher elasticity  of  labor  supply.  Bea.ring this  in  mind  it  is
straightforward  that  we get smaller declines in  consumption, and greater increases in output,
effort and investment in response  to the same shocks, Interest rates increase  by more,which we
can rationalise either in terms of the greater growth in consumption that  occurs over the course
of the war or in terms of greater effort enhancing the marginal productivity  of capital.
7,  Conclusion
In this paper I attempt  to evaluate the ability  of the basic neoclassical  growth  model to explain
the efrects  of temporary  government purchases  on the macroeconomy, I focus on one particular
episode of temporaxy government purchases, namely World  War  II,  and find  that  the nodel
achieves  some measure of success  in explaining movements in quantities over the course of the
conflict,  The model performs least satisfactorily in explainiug moyements in interest rates.
A  number of points should be noted in conclusion. The analysis in this paper treats all of
the variation  in government purchases  over the course of World  War II  as changes  in purchases
of final  output.  Yet  we know that  the goverument also ,,purchased',  signiffcant quantities  of
inputs,  most notably  labor by means of the draft.  It  is common in macroeconomic analysis to
t4abstract ftom  the compeitional  efiects of cha.nges  in government purchases, a,nd to the extent
that  the technologr  used by the government to ploduce its final output  using inputs  of capital
and labor is the same as that  available to the private sector such abstraction  is innocuous.  In
Wynne(1989)  I  extend the basic model to  a.llow for government purchases of inpute  and find
that  this extension has some ability  to e-xplain  the behaviour of interest rates.
A  common concern when looking at wartime  economies  is that  there may be some unob-
servable shift  in agents preferneces  for the duration  of the conflict  that  induces them to  work
harder or aave  more than they normally  would at prevailing real wages  and interest rates. One
would expect such a change in tastes to be reflected in productivity  increases  over and above
those that  could be explained by other factors.  There were large inoeases in the productiviiy
of both  Iabor and  capital  in  the  United  States over the  course of the war.  But  most of  the
rncrease  car  probably  be atiributed  to  technological breakthroughs  and improvements in the
organization  of production  in response to  the high level of demand rather  than  greater efiort
associated  with  a desire to win the war. In support of this argument Milward(lg87)  notes that
there were almost no improvements in productivity  in the coal mining industry  over the course
of the war, despite the fact that  coal was still the most important  source  of energy for industria.l
production.
I  model the increase in  government purchases associated with  World  War  II  as a purely
temporary  phenomenon, although it  is clear from Figure 2 that  there was a permanent increase
in the share of GNP absorbed by the government at about the same time.  It  may be possible to
extend the model to allow for this, although determining the timing  of the permanent inoease
would be rather difficult.  one  a.lternative would be to look at the experience over the course of
'World  War  I, although  here we would have to  worry  about  the problem of poor  quality  data.
Two  additional  advantages  to looking at the experience during world  war  I a.re  that  it  wasn'i
preceded  by a major  depression  and that the use of price controls was less  extensive than during
World  War II-
15Table 1.A
Sample Autocorrelations
Series Nobs fl t2 ra r4
GNP 98 0.96 0.92 0.89 0.85 0.82
Consumption 98 0.96 0.93 0,89 0,86 0.82
Investment o.l 0.89 0.75 0.63 0.57 0.53
Govt  Purchases 98 0.95 0.88 0.83 0.78 0.75
Notes  to  Thble 1.A.  All series  are  in natural logs  and per capita. For the period 1g2g-
1986,  data are  from National Income  and  Product Accounis  of the llnited  States,  7g2g-1g82:
Statistjcal Tables  and recent  issuee  of Survey  of Current Business.  For the period 1889-1928
data a^re  fiom Table  A-IIa of Kendrick  Productivity Tlends  jn  the united,  States.  Data in 19Zg
dollars  were  converted  to 1982  dollars  using  19Zg  as  the year  of overlap.
Notes to  Table t.B.  All series  a.re  first differences  of per capita  natural logs.
Table 1.8
Sample Autocorrelatious: First  Differences
Series Nobs f1 13 r4 rs
GNP 97 0.25 0.04 -0.1I -0.24 -0.24
Consumption o7 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 0.03 -0,09
Investment 96 0.21 -0.10 -0.29 -0.14 -0.00
Govt Purchases o7 0.29 -0.20 -0,14 -0.24 -0.31
16Table  2
Test for  unit  roots
Model:  z1  =p+"lt+plzFr+...+pk(zt-h+l  -  zt-E\
Series Nobs i ^l t(i) "(ir)
se
GNP 96 2 0.004 3.693 0.801 -J.,  OO 0.056
Consumption 97 1 0.002 2.330 0.887 -2.306 0.0004
Investment va 2 0.003 2.539 0.8r6 -3.538- 0.215
Govt Purchasee 96 0.007 4.214 0.724 -4.678-. 0.178
Notes  to  Table  2.  z1  is the natural log of the series.  t(f)  is the usual  t-statistic for i.
r(11) is the ratio of p1  -  1 to its standard  error. * denotes  reject IIq i pt :  l al the b%  level;  ..






























Yea"r Actual Model(0) Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(U)
I -t0.2 -26.2 -19.0 -14.4 -  11.5 -4.9
2 -11.0 -23.8 -r7  .9 -  11.8 -  13.9
-11.0 -16.5 -  11.5 -24.2
4 -8.0 -18.4 -14.5 -12.0 -10.4 -31.5
Output
I 14.5 21.0 23.0 25.1 4.0
31.0 22.7 24.3 25.4 26.1 o.,
37.4 18.0 19.3 20.2 20.7 7.2
4 31.0 /,o 8.7 9.4 9.9 3.4
Effort
1 7.8 31.5 28.1 25.9 24.5 6.0
12.5 3r.0 28.2 26.4 25.2
13.0 26.2 23.9 21.5 21.0
4 8.8 17.4 r  5,5 14.3 13.5
Investment
I 44,9 39.9 36.7 -63.r
2 -69.5 -39.4 -46.1 -  I19.5
-66.9 -113.9 -119,1 -122.4 -124.5 - 151  .1
4 -56.4 -t46.5 -r49.2 -150.9 -1?8.0
Interest  R-ates
1 -3.6 2.5 L.2 0.3 -0.3 0.9
2 2.5 1,.4 0.7 0.2 2.6
.' -3.8 2.0 1.5 1.1 4.5
4 -23.9 3.4 2.7 2.2 1.9 5.9
Notes  to Table 3. (1) Percentage  deviations  from steady  state  of key aggregates.  (2)pa-
rameter  ralues: 0  =  0.9615,q* =  on =  -1,6"1 =  otc =  0,N  -  0.$A,e"  =  0.662,6  =
0.1,  o761y  =  l,0o =  9.2951,1,  =  1.018.  (3)Model(0)  denotes  predictions  of the model  when
the war begins  in period 0, Model(l)  the prediciions  when the war begins  in period 1, etc.
19Model(u)  denotes the predictions  of the model when the higher purchases are unanticipated
each period.  (4)Year 1 denotes the first year of the war, Year I  ihe second, etc.  For the ac-
tual  data,  1942 is taken io  be the first  year of WWII,  and lg4b  the fourth.  (b)The  rtata for
consumption,  output  and investment under Actual  were obtained by fitting  a common deter-
ministic  trend  to Personal Consumption  Expenditures, Gross Private Investment, Government
Purchases  of Goods and services, and GNP, all in terms ofbillions  of 1g82  dollars and expressed
in  per capita telmsJ over the period  1889-1982. The reported numbers are the residuals from
this system expressed  a.s  a fraction of the predicted values. The data for effort under Actual  are
the percentage deviations of Average Weekly Hours in Manufacturing  during the war yea,rs  from
the average value over 1931-40. The data under Actual  for the interest rate are the deviations






















































Alternative  defiuition  of effort
Consurnption
Year Actual Model(0) Model(1) Mode(2) Model(3) Model(U)
1 -  10.2 -21.0 -8.8 -6.1 -4.2
2 -1l.il -t7  .4 -11.4 -7.8 -l1.6
-11.0 -14.O -9.7 -6.9 -20.0
4 -8.0 -  11.8 -8.1 -5.8 -4.5
Output
I 14.5 30.9 32.0 33.0 6.2
2 31.0 33.4 34.2 34.7 35,0 11.?
3 37  .4 27  .7 24.3 28.7 29.0 14.8
4 3l.0 14.4 15.0 r  5.3 75.4 12.5
Effort
1 46.4 46.3 40.4 36.9 34.8 9.3
2 66.9 45.3 40.7 37  .9 ito.it 20.8
69.3 .t/.o 34,0 3i.8 30.5 31.  I
4 58.8 20.5 18.8 17.8 34.1
Investrnent
1 -52.1 81.0 68.3 60.8 56.3 -55.9
2 -69.5 -4.0 -14.0 -20.0 -23.5 -104.3
-66.9 -89.8 -102.3 -105.1 -129.6
4 -56.4 -129.4 -135.6 -139.3 -141.5 -  r  06.3
Interegt  R"ates
t -.1,D 3.6 2.0 1.0 0.4 0.9
2 -2.4 3,0 r.7 0.9 0.5 2.5
-3.8 2.7 t.7 1.1 0.7 4.3
4 -23.9 2.5 t.7 1t 1.0 5.5
Notes  to  Table 4.  (l)Percentage  deviations  from steady  state of key aggregates.  (2)Pa-
rameter  values:  0 = 0.9615,o*  = trn  =  -1,6.1  -  crc  = 0,N = (0.399X0.924),  r,v =0.667,6  =
0 1,  o;r1.  = I,0o = 0.2951,1,  = 1.018.  (3)Model(0)  denotes  predictions  of the  model  when  the
wal begins  in period  0,  Model(1)  the  predictions  when  the  war  begins  in period  1,  eic. Model(U)denotes  the predictions  of the model  when  the higher  purchases  a.re  unanticipated  each  period.
(4)Year  1 denotes  the first year  of the war, Year 2 ihe second,  etc. For the actual data, 1942  is
taken to be the ffrst year  of WWII,  and 1945  the fourth. (b) The daia under  Actual for efort
are the sum of the changes  in Average  Weekly  Hours  in Manufacturing  and the pariicipation
rate as  defined  in the text. For definition  ofthe rest  of the.data  under  "A.ctual  see  notes  to Table
24Appendix
The equilibrium  path of the economy  is given  by the system  of equations
D1U(c1,1-  N,)  = l,
D2U  (q, 1  -  N.) = .\rDz.F  (/cr,  Nr)
g'lr+r[(1 -  d)  + DlF(h+l,14+r)]  = €,]r
f'(bi, Nr)  + (1  -  6)fu  = c1* {"tr+r * sr.
Taking a linear approximation  of this system  around  the steady  state yields  the following:
6""6,-  o"tT+N, = ^l
o,"t,  -  ou_]rfu = ir * ?,v*[r  * 7,vwN,
i,*, * {(&{9  }(t*i,+rr  z*ivlr'r+r)  = ir
o&t*o|l''  "  "frr  k' I {r  + (I - ,)tAr  = 0"i,* -t,kt+t10cit
where c;i  =  the elasiicity of the marginal utility  of i (consumption or leisure) with  respect
to j  (leisure or consumption), 1i  =  ihe elasticiiy of the marginal product  of j  with  respect to i,
d1 =  the share of outpui  accruing to capital, 0iv =  the share of output  acouing  to labour, d" =
the share of consumption expenditures in steady state output,  and do =  the share of government
purchases in  stea.dy  state output,  Note thai  constant returns  to scale irnplies TIi  + ?*N  =  0
and Trvr *  ?rv,v =  0. Also  'ltu  =  0x /axN  and 7,nls  =  fif  oyy,  where a4,y  is the elasticity  of
substitution  between capital and labour.  Thus dL' and a167y  fully  characterize the technology.
All  elasticiiies and shares are evaluated at  their stationary  state values. The hats  ',^,' denote
percentage deviations from steady state levels, i.e. fu =  (q  -  x)fn.
Solution of the linearised model proceeds  in two stages. First  we solve the pair of simulta-
neoue  difference  equations  in I  and i  that produce  the dyna.mics.  Then we solve  for i, n, y , i
and i  at each  point in time as  functions  of the state variablee  i  and i,  and the forcing  variable
f.  From the first  two equations in the linearized system we obtain(u,\=("*  -oaf;  \-'f  o  1\1f,)
\fr,,/ 
- 
\o"  _"rr__o"_n")  \r"*  r/ \i,/
Using this to eliminate consumption and effort from the second pair, we obtain
(t'-')=o(t')*so,
\ ^,+1  ,/  \ ^r ,/
where the elements of A  and Q are complicated functions of the parameters of tastes and
technology, and the various shares and elasticities appearing in equations (16)-(19). This is the
standard  linear  diference  model.  The  solution  of models of  this  cla.ss  has been analysed by
Blanchard  and Kaln(1980)  and is discussed  at some length in the technical appendix of King,
Plosser and Rebelo(1988).
From  the  structure  of  the  opiimizaiion  problem  that  underlies this  difference equation
system, we know that  the solution will  be saddle point stable (see  Levhari a.nd  Liviata.n(1g?2)).
One of the eigenvalues  of A  will  lie outside the unit  circle and one inside. More specifically, the
stable  root is that associated  with I  and the unstable  root thai associated  with i,  I will not go
into the pa"rticula.rs  of the solution here, but simply  assert that  it  rs
(i:lr  )
-"  (i)  ri  r;' 
-i  (p\,Qro  -t  pizQt)At+r+ij,
+P






\P2r  Pz2  )
(t ,1,)"-'
" ':  Gi:  ii:)
s  =  (g:,)
\"{ ^g /
a"nd  41 is the stable root,  and g2 ihe unstable.  Note the dependance of & and i  on the entire
future  path  of government spending shocks. This  is the outcome of forward looking behaviourand will generate all ofthe  results in response  to anticipated spending shocks. For further details
on the solution procedure, see  the technica.l  appendlr  to King,  Plosser and Bebelo(1g88).
Ilaving  solved for i  and i  it  is straightforward  to find the values of the other variables of
interest.  The deviations of consumption and efiort from their steady state lalues are found from
(:\  =  ("""  _o:,;i  \-'l  o  l\ f  4,)
\ n,,/  \oa  -otf;  - t"" )  \.r"r  1/ \ l,,i
Output  and gross investment are given by the equations
at='hh+enfu,
ir=e;t1gr-r  ...-osct\.
The first of these comes  from log differentiation of the production function, the second  from
log differentiation of the aggregate  resource constraint.  Net investment is defined as
n^
ii =il_6(:)bt.
Finally  we recover (relative)  prices.  In  this  model  these are the  interest  rate  and  the
rea.l wage.  The  interest  rate  is obtained  from  the  condition  for  intertemporal  elnciency in
consumption, which yields
r1  - t = o,"(t1-  ii+r)  - 
$"rtN, 
- 4*r,
where i  is the steady state level of the interest rate18. The real wage is simply  the marginal
product of labour:
r\  =  11'11,is  *  tr,vl{r.
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